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BuRNs v. ASTRUE: "BORN IN PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES,"
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN AND THE
ADEQUACY OF STATE INTESTACY LAWS
ABSTRACT
A posthumously conceived child is one born to a woman who became
pregnant by the preserved semen of a dead man. This Comment exam-
ines the rights of posthumously conceived children to receive social se-
curity benefits using an example from the Utah Supreme Court, Burns v.
Astrue. Currently, the result is determined by the intestacy laws of the
state where the semen donor died. It also discusses the applicable intesta-
cy provisions in the states comprising the Tenth Circuit, as well as the
approaches used by the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Parent-
age Act. The Comment concludes by addressing whether it would be
more desirable to leave the determination of the issue to each state, to
pass federal legislation that would bring all states into conformity with
each other, or to adopt model legislation in every state.
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INTRODUCTION
Robert Bums wrote the poem On the Birth of a Posthumous Child
in 1790.1 In it, the great poet, whose last child was born on the day of his
funeral,2 noted that a baby born after its father's death has come into the
world missing "the shelt'ring tree" that would "shield thee frae the
storm."3 Gayle Burns (no relation to the poet) was probably not thinking
of the two-hundred-year-old poem when she decided in 2003 to become
pregnant by preserved sperm from her deceased husband.4 When she
later applied for social security benefits, Gayle Burns applied for herself
and her child because her deceased husband was no longer alive to care
for them.5 Subsequently, a legal battle arose as to whether the Govern-
ment or Gayle Bums herself would be the sheltering tree for this post-
humous child born two years and nine months after the death of its bio-
logical father.6 The Utah Supreme Court recently decided the issue in
Burns v. Astrue.
7
The facts in Burns are similar to other cases that address posthu-
mously conceived children: a husband or lover dies prematurely after
cryogenically preserving his sperm; months or years later the woman
conceives a child using the man's sperm and files for social security ben-
8efits based on the man's income. Oftentimes, the woman will apply di-
rectly with the Social Security Administration (SSA).9 The Social Securi-
ty Act (Act), however, contains a provision that leaves such questions to
state intestacy laws.10 The laws in each state vary drastically; thus, the
1. Robert Bums, On the Birth of a Posthumous Child, in I THE COMPLETE POETICAL
WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS 374, 374 (William Scott Douglas ed., 1871).
2. JAMES CURRIE, 1 THE LIFE OF ROBERT BURNS, WITH A CRITICISM ON His WRITINGS 52
(1838).
3. Bums, supra note 1.
4. Burns v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 553 (Utah 2012).
5. Id. at 554.
6. Id.
7. 289 P.3d 551 (Utah 2012).
8. See Alycia Kennedy, Note, Social Security Survivor Benefits: Why Congress Must Create
a Uniform Standard of Eligibility for Posthumously Conceived Children, 54 B.C. L. REV. 821, 821-
22(2013).
9. See id
10. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato I), 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2028 (2012) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012)).
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outcome of whether the child can receive benefits is determined by the
location in which the husband or lover died."
Part I of this Comment discusses the various forms of assisted re-
productive technology that give rise to the legal issues of posthumously
conceived children whose fathers die intestate. It also addresses the Act
and its provisions that leave the status of a child to state intestacy laws.
Finally, the deference afforded to the SSA, the circuit split, and the sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision are addressed in Part I. Part II of this
Comment discusses the state intestacy laws within the Tenth Circuit that
address-or do not address-the ability of posthumously conceived chil-
dren to inherit under state law as well as the adoption of the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) and the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and their
effects. Part III explores the most recent posthumously conceived child
case within the Tenth Circuit, Burns v. Astrue-a Utah Supreme Court
case that examines one method the courts use to analyze consent to be
the parent. Part IV examines the moral and ethical implications of
providing or not providing social security benefits to posthumously con-
ceived children. Part V analyzes whether a federal amendment to the Act
or leaving the issue to state intestacy laws would be the best remedy go-
ing forward. Finally, Part VI recommends nationwide changes to state
intestacy laws that must be considered in order to provide posthumously
conceived children with access to benefits as well as protect social secu-
rity funds from fraud.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Assisted Reproductive Technology and Cryopreservation
As early as 1790, women were being artificially inseminated via
turkey basters.12 In modem times, advancements in medicine have al-
lowed for more sophisticated but equally unromantic methods of artifi-
cially conceiving. There are two popular mechanisms. Artificial insemi-
nation, the means used in Burns v. Astrue, is the most common form of
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), possibly because it is the
cheapest.13 Also called intrauterine insemination, artificial insemination
is performed by placing the sperm into the woman's uterus through arti-
ficial means such as a syringe (turkey basters are banished to the kitch-
11. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) ("[Tlhe devolution of intestate personal property [is determined]
•.. if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the
time of his death.").
12. Alyssia J. Bryant, Comment, Death, Sperm Heists, and Test Tube Babies: Support for
Measures to Prevent Social Security Abuse, Conserve Government Funds, and Protect Families, 56
How. L.J. 917, 926 n.44 (2013).
13. Amanda Homer, Comment, I Consented to Do What?: Posthumous Children and the
Consent o Parent After-Death, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 157, 159 (2008).
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en).14 In vitro fertilization (IVF), a much newer form of technology, is
another popular method of ART.15 This approach requires extracting the
woman's egg from her uterus and combining it with a single sperm in a
laboratory.16 Both methods can be done with the use of cryogenically
preserved semen-a practice that gives rise to the issue raised in this
Comment.17 In 1949, scientists discovered that they could treat sperm
with glycerol and freeze it for extended periods.'8 This revelation later
led to the first pregnancy derived from cryopreserved sperm in 1953.19
Before cryopreservation, the determination of one's heirs was rela-
tively easy and straightforward.20 The class was closed upon the death of
the woman or it closed nine months after the man's death.2' However,
the advent of cryogenically preserved sperm stored in liquid nitrogen
allows for long-term conservation and conception far beyond the death of
the father.22 In fact, it is possible to preserve semen for up to ten years or
more when stored at temperatures minus 100 degrees Celsius.23 Cryogen-
ically preserved semen has complicated probate laws around the country
and has presented new issues of survivorship in regard to social security
benefits for children.
B. The Social Security Act and Status of a Child
In August of 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Act
into law to establish a program that would allow retired workers over the
age of 65 to receive benefits.24 The Act, otherwise known as the "Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance," or more colloquially as Social
Security, received a huge overhaul in 1939 in order to provide monthly
benefits not only to retired workers but also to surviving families of
workers who died prematurely.25 The Act was created to protect individ-
uals from becoming destitute when they lost their "earning power.26
14. See Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old lceblock: How Cryopreservation Has
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347, 352 (2011).
15. Id. at 353.
16. Horner, supra note 13, at 160.
17. See Carpenter, supra note 14, at 355.
18. Id
19. Id. at 355-56.
20. Id. at 349.
21. Id.
22. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Securi-
ty Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 270 (1999).
23. Id.
24. Bryant, supra note 12, at 920 ("President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act ...
into law in 1935 ...."); Robert J. Myers, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Provisions:
Summary of Legislation, 1935-58, SOC. SECURITY BULL. at 15 (1959) available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v22n1/v22nIp1 5.pdf.
25. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 826 (stating that the goal of survivor benefits was "to replace
the lost financial support of the deceased wage eamer"); Myers, supra note 24.
26. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633 (1974). The Court further explained that the
"provisions excluding some afterbom illegitimates from recovery are designed only to prevent
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Congress did not contemplate the technology available today that allows
women to conceive children far beyond the father's death.27 Nor did
Congress contemplate the technology when it amended the Act in 1965
to read as it does now.28 This is one reason why the current legislation is
inadequate to protect posthumously conceived children.
In order to claim survivorship benefits under the Act, several re-
quirements must be met.29 These include: (1) the child is unmarried; (2)
the child is under eighteen or subject to a disability; and (3) the child is
dependent upon the individual at the time of the individual's death.30 The
Act, however, requires a more fundamental question to be answered
first.31 The child must satisfy the definition of "child" as set out in 42
U.S.C. § 416(e).32 Prior to the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Astrue
v. Capato (Capato J),33 federal appellate courts were split on the issue of
whether posthumously conceived children fit the definition of child un-
der the Act.34 The appellate court decisions all turned on the definition of
child in section 416(e) and section 416(h)'s elaboration on that defini-
tion.35
To meet the definition of a child under the Act, section 412(d) pro-
vides the first bit of guidance and sets out the "basic grant of benefits.36
Section 402(d) states that "[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of
this title) of an individual ... who dies a fully or currently insured indi-
vidual, .... shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit."37 Turning
then to section 416(e), several definitions of child are provided, includ-
ing: (1) a child or legally adopted child of an individual; (2) a stepchild;
and (3) a grandchild or step-grandchild of an individual or his spouse.
38
Because the quoted preceding sections are vague and lack elaboration,
39
one must next turn to section 416(h)(2)(A), which is the "next gateway"
to determine whether a child is eligible for benefits.40 The provision enti-
tled "Determination of Family Status" provides:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully
or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the
spurious claims and ensure that only those actually entitled to benefit receive payments." Id. at 633-
34.
27. Capato I, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011).
30. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B)-(C) (2012).
31. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
32. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 2004).
33. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
34. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012).
35. Id. at 2027-28.
36. Capato I1, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C)(iii); Capato 1H, 132 S. Ct. at 2027.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2012); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011).
39. Capato H, 132 S. Ct. at 2027-28.
40. Bryant, supra note 12, at 924-25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be
applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property
by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domi-
ciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domi-
ciled at the time of his death 1
There are other "narrower categories" listed under section 416(h) that
provide other methods for determining the status of a child, but these
criteria do not apply to posthumously conceived children.4 2
Both the Supreme Court and the SSA consider section 416(h) as
"completing § 416(e)'s sparse definition of 'child."' '43 Both sections (e)
and (h) are used together when analyzing the status of a child.44 Thus, in
order for a posthumously conceived child to receive benefits, the child
must qualify under the applicable state's intestacy laws as stated in sec-
tion 416(h)(2)(A) .
C. Pre-Capato II and SSA Deference
Before the Supreme Court decided Capato II in May 2012, there
was much confusion in the federal courts about whether the regulations
promulgated by the SSA were interpretations of sections 416(e) and
416(h) of the Act entitled to Chevron deference.46 An agency's regula-
tions are entitled to Chevron deference "when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency" and the agency promulgated rules
using notice and comment rulemaking or "some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent.,47 Chevron deference is a two-step
process: (1) determine whether Congress spoke directly to the issue at
hand; and (2) if not, whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable.48
If both steps are satisfied, then the agency's interpretation is afforded
deference.49 In 2011, the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits were
split on the issue of whether the SSA's interpretation of the Act was enti-
tled to deference.50 All four appellate courts used tools of statutory con-
struction, but the Third and Ninth Circuits completely missed the most
important textual clue.5 The textual clue, contained in section 416(h),
41. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A); Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2028.
42. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 827 28.
43. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2029.
44. Id.; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 828.
45. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2028.
46. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 830.
47. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
48. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
49. Id.
50. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 962 (8th Cir. 2011); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 835 n. 136.
51. Capato ll, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2024 (2012).
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requires reference to section 416(h) after passing through section
416(e).
52
The SSA has interpreted sections 416(e) and 416(h) of the Act using
official "notice-and-comment rulemaking.,53 Additionally, Congress
gave the Social Security Commissioner authority to issue regulations
"that are 'necessary or appropriate to carry out' his functions."54 The
SSA's regulations are analogous to sections 416(e) and 416(h) of the
Act 55 and parallel the statute's provisions by "elaborat[ing] on its
terms.",56 The regulations refer the reader to other parts of the regulations,
as does the Act, to determine whether the child is a "natural child," simi-
lar to references found in section 416(h) of the Act regarding the status
of a child.57 Under the regulations, a natural child is eligible for benefits
if he or she meets any one of four conditions, including the condition of
being capable of inheriting "the insured's personal property as his or her
natural child under State inheritance laws., 58 The regulations establish
"that the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the provisions of § 416(h)
are the exclusive means by which an applicant can establish child status
under § 416(e) as a natural child. 59
In the 2004 decision Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,60 the Ninth Circuit
became the first federal court to decide the issue of a posthumously con-
ceived child's status under the Act.61 The Ninth Circuit did not conduct a
Chevron two-step analysis in its opinion to determine whether the SSA
should be afforded deference.62 The court, however, concluded that sec-
tion 416(h) had no relevance in determining the status of a biological
child conceived after the death of the father.63 This provision was only
52. Compare Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2024 (stating that the "key textual clue" is found in
416(h), which states "for purposes of this subchapter" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629 (3d Cir. 2011) (determining that
416(h) is not applicable and thus does not need to be used to analyze posthumously conceived chil-
dren), rev'd sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2012 (2012), and Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining that 416(h) is only used when parentage is
in dispute, and in the case of posthumously conceived children, parentage is not in dispute when the
mother and father are known).
53. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 829 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350, .354
to .355 (2012)).
54. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959-60 (citing 42 U.S.C. § § 405, 902 (2012)).
55. It should be noted that 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 is analogous to § 416(e) of the Act, and 20
C.F.R. § 404.355(a) is analogous to § 416(h)(2)(A) of the Act. Id at 960.
56. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 831.
57. Section 404.354 of the regulations includes language that should refer the reader to
§ 404.355 to determine whether the child is a "natural child" similar to the guidance found in
§ 416(e) of the Act. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960.
58. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(1) (2012); Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960.
59. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. Bryant, supra note 12, at 931; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832.
62. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 n.4; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832.
63. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832.
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used to determine if the child could receive benefits when the "parents
were not married or [the] parentage was in dispute."'
64
Approximately six years later, the Third Circuit agreed with the
Ninth Circuit and declined to give Chevron deference to the SSA's inter-
pretation of the statute.65 The court stated that section 416(h) merely of-
fers other methods by which a child can inherit when parentage is in
doubt.66 The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute demon-
strates that when a child is the biological offspring of the parents, courts
only need to pass through sections 402(d) and 416(e).67 The court ended
its opinion by noting that "technology has outpaced federal and state
laws," which fail to address the issue of posthumously conceived chil-
dren.68 The public policy reasoning behind the Ninth and the Third Cir-
cuit opinions demonstrates that Social Security laws need to address the-
se issues that will continue to arise with the continuing advancement of
medical technology.
69
The Eighth and Fourth Circuit decisions, handed down in 2011,
contained reasoning that greatly conflicted with the Ninth Circuit, thus
creating the circuit split.70 Both the Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the SSA's interpretation of the Act, which requires appli-
cants to pass through section 416(h) in order to determine the status of a
posthumously conceived child for purposes of the Act.71 The Fourth Cir-
cuit determined that Congress had spoken to the issue because the plain
language of the statute demonstrated that the meaning of child included
the definitions under section 416(h).72 The court noted that Congress's
intent was clear because section 416(h) included the words "for purposes
of this subchapter," which required reference to section 416(e).73 The
court concluded that even if Congress did not speak clearly on the issue,
the agency's interpretation is reasonable and deference should be grant-
ed.74
64. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 833.
65. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 835-36.
66. Capato ex reL. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011), rev'd
sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 632 (quoting Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Bryant, supra note 12, at 934.
69. See Bryant, supra note 12, at 936.
70. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 837.
71. See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 2011); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954,
961 (8th Cir. 2011); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 837.
72. See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54.




D. Capato II: The Supreme Court Addresses a Sticky Situation
The Supreme Court finally settled the issue of deference in Capato
H.75 Justice Ginsburg, delivering the opinion for a unanimous Court,
swiftly concluded that the SSA's interpretation of the Act denying social
security benefits to a child conceived after the father's death was, at the
very least, "a permissible construction that garners the Court's respect
under Chevron."76 The Court looked to the core purpose of the Act,
which was to establish a program to "provide ... dependent members of
[a wage earner's] family with protection against the hardship occasioned
by [the] loss of [the insured's] earnings.,77 The purpose was not simply
to generate income for the needy.
78
The Court did not conduct a thorough Chevron analysis, but instead
glossed over steps one and two, and simply held that the SSA's interpre-
tation of the Act was better than the one proposed by the respondent,
because it was at the very least a reasonable interpretation.79 The Court
spent most of the opinion combing through the statute and addressing the
respondent's arguments of statutory interpretation, thereby implying that
Congress's intent was unambiguous.80 For instance, the respondent ar-
gued, and the Third Circuit had agreed, that there was no reference to
section 416(h) in section 416(e), and thus, section 416(e) was irrelevant
in this case.81 The Court used its statutory interpretation repertoire to
counter this argument.82 Justice Ginsburg noted that the "key textual
clue" lies in subsection 416(h)(2)(A), which states that in order to deter-
mine "whether an applicant is the child... of [an] insured individual for
purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner... shall apply [state in-
testacy law]., 83 The word "subchapter" in section 416(h) refers to sec-
tions 401 to 434, which is the entirety of Subchapter 11.84 Although it is
not a direct reference, it is a reference nonetheless and "Congress had no
need to place a redundant cross-reference" in either section 416(h) or
section 416(e).85
Justice Ginsburg wrote that using state intestacy law to determine
the status of a child under the Act is "anything but anomalous"; the Act
75. Capato I1, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012).
76. Id. at 2025-26 (citation omitted); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 840.
77. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2032 (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 2026; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 840.
80. See Capato 11, 132 S. Ct. at 2030-32; see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 839-40.
81. Capato ll, 132 S. Ct. at 2031.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2023-24, 2031 (alterations and omissions in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012)).
84. Id. at 2031.
85. Id. at 2030-31 (stating that the phrase "purposes of this subchapter" in § 416(h)(2)(A)
refers to the entirety of Subchapter II, so there is no need to put another reference to 416(e) in the
statute).
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refers to state law in other provisions to determine family status, such as
the definition of "wife. 86 For instance, in section 416(b), the definition
of wife is somewhat amorphous by stating "the wife of an [insured] indi-
vidual., 87 The definition is further clarified in section 416(h) where the
cross-reference "for purposes of this subchapter" is found. It directs that
the applicant must be married and if not, then the status of wife must be
determined by state intestacy laws.88 This same method of defining the
family status is found for "husband" and "widower" within the Act as
well.89
The Court also disagreed with the Third Circuit's reversal based on
the biological status of the child and the respondent's argument regarding
the legitimacy of the child.90 The Third Circuit determined that the anal-
ysis could stop at section 416(e) because the status of a child is deter-
mined by its biological status.91 Justice Ginsburg disagreed by writing
that nothing in section 416(e) indicated that the biological status of the
child determined its status as a child under the Act.92 The word "biologi-
cal" did not appear anywhere in the Act.93 The respondent countered
with the dictionary definition of child and argued that it meant "legiti-
mate offspring."94 But, once again, nothing in Congress's definition of
child showed intent for a child to merely attain status as a child through
legitimacy or illegitimacy.95 Therefore, the Court determined that "'bio-
logical' parentage" is not a prerequisite for classification as a child for
96purposes of 416(e).
II. INTESTACY LAWS WITHIN THE TENTH CIRCUIT STATES AND THE
UNIFORM CODES
For posthumous conception cases, the status of a child requires ref-
erence to the intestacy laws of the state where the father was domiciled
when he died.97 Currently, only seven states explicitly allow posthu-
mously conceived children to inherit from deceased parents.98 The re-
maining states either expressly prohibit posthumously conceived children
from inheriting intestate property, do not address it at all, or mandate
86. Id. at 2031; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 841.
87. Capato 11, 132 S. Ct. at 2031 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2027, 2029.
91. Id. at 2029.
92. Id. at 2030.
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 2029 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 465 (2d ed. 1934)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2030.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012).
98. Currently, Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, and New
York each have a statute expressly allowing posthumously conceived children to inherit under state
intestacy laws. See Bryant, supra note 12, at 930.
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various types of prerequisites before they can inherit.99 Four states within
the Tenth Circuit require prerequisites for a posthumously conceived
child to inherit from the parents. Colorado and New Mexico have adopt-
ed the UPC, whereas Utah and Wyoming have adopted the UPA. ° Two
states within the Tenth Circuit-Kansas and Oklahoma-do not address
posthumously conceived children whatsoever.10' Part II discusses the
UPC and the Tenth Circuit states that have adopted the intestacy sections
of the UPC. Then it discusses the UPA and the states that have adopted
the intestacy portions of the UPA. Finally, it examines other methods by
which Tenth Circuit states have dealt with the issue of posthumously
conceived children within their statutes.
A. Uniform Probate Code
The UPC was adopted in full by nineteen states and has been par-
tially adopted by many others since its inception in 1969. ° 2 A major
revision of the UPC by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) took place in 2008, which helped mod-
ernize the UPC's treatment of children of assisted reproduction.0 3 Before
the 2008 amendments (UPC Amendments), the UPC did not address
what happens when a parent dies before sperm is taken from cryopreser-
vation to be used for insemination.104 Since the UPC Amendments, the
only states within the Tenth Circuit that have adopted the section on arti-
ficial reproduction are Colorado and New Mexico.
10 5
The UPC Amendments address consent and the timing of concep-
tion with much more clarity than any other model act.106 Under the UPC
Amendments, the parent must provide consent, which can be shown by a
signed record that "evidences the individual's consent.' ' 10 The wife can
choose to conceive the child up to thirty-six months after the death of the
husband.0 8 The UPC allows for a presumption of consent of a posthu-
99. See id. at 931.
100. Wendy S. Goffe, Postmortem Conception Quandary: When Must an Heir Be Here?, 40
EST. PLAN. 17, 18-24 (July 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120 (2013).
101. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 228 (2013).
102. Probate Code Amendments (2008) Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%2OCode%20Amendments / 20(2008) (last
visited May 26, 2014).
103. Id.
104. Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899,
901 (2012).
105. Legislative Fact Sheet - Probate Code Amendments (2008), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=probate%2OCode%2OAmendments%20
(2008) (last visited May 26, 2014); Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited May 26, 2014) (showing
that Utah adopted the UPA regarding posthumous conception).
106. Jennifer Matystik, Recent Development, Posthumously Conceived Children: Why States
Should Update Their Intestacy Laws After Astrue v. Capato, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
269, 288-89 (2013) (noting that the UPC is more clear than the UPA and the ABA Model Act).
107. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1) (amended 2010).
108. Id. § 2-120(k)(l).
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mously conceived child as follows: (1) as long as a wife can prove that
there was no divorce proceeding at her husband's death;10 9 (2) that the
father intended to serve as the parent of the child but was unable to do so
because of illness or death;'10 or (3) if "intent is established by clear and
convincing evidence."
'11
Additionally, the NCCUSL encourages states to "enact a provision
requiring genetic depositories to provide a consent form that would satis-
fy [the] subsection" regarding consent. 12 The drafters of the 2008 UPC
Amendments cited to a consent form included in the California Health
and Safety Code." 3 This consent form states, "if you wish to allow a
child conceived after your death to be considered as your heir (or benefi-
ciary of other benefits such as life insurance or retirement) you must
specify that in writing and you must sign that written expression of in-
tent."'1 4 This is an excellent example of how donor sites could aid cou-
ples going through traumatic cancer treatments to specifically consider
and deal with the possibility of conceiving after the father has died.
The UPC provision on posthumously conceived children was mod-
elled after an amendment to the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act (USCACA), which was drafted in 1988 by the
NCCUSL.1 1 5 Originally, the USCACA explicitly excluded posthumously
conceived children, but in 2000 the NCCUSL struck the provision and
decided to recognize posthumously conceived children as long as the
deceased parent consented to be the parent of the child.
116
1. Colorado and New Mexico
Both Colorado and New Mexico explicitly addressed posthumously
conceived children in their intestacy statutes by adopting the 2008
amendments to the UPC. 117 Colorado adopted the 2008 amendments for
assisted reproduction in 2009 and the legislation became effective in
2010.1 8 New Mexico's statute adopting the 2008 amendments to the
UPC took effect in 2012.119
109. Id. § 2-120(h)(1).
110. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(B).
111. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
112. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE 43 (2008); Matystik, supra note 106, at 289.
113. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 112, at 43 (citing
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1644.7 (West 2013), titled "Form provided to depositor regarding
decedent's intent for use of material pursuant to Probate Code § 249.5").
114. HEALTH & SAFETY § 1644.7.
115. Goffe, supra note 100, at 23.
116. Id.
117. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120 (West 2013); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (amended 2010).
118. Elizabeth A. Bryant et al., Changes to Colorado's Uniform Probate Code, 39 COLO. LAW.
41,41 (2010).
119. § 45-2-120; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120.
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Under New Mexico and Colorado law, the first determination that
must take place is whether there is a parent-child relationship between
the deceased and the child. 20 In order for a parent-child relationship to
be established when a child is conceived through ART, these states re-
quire the father to consent to "assisted reproduction by the birth mother
with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child.' 2' Additionally,
determination of intestate succession depends on whether the child is
"treated as in gestation" at the time of the father's death.2 2 If the child is
conceived through ART and the father dies before the birth of the child,
the child will be "treated as in gestation,"'123 if the child is: (1) "[i]n utero
not later than thirty-six months after the individual's death;" or (2)
"[b]orn not later than forty-five months after the individual's death.'
124
Similar to the UPC, consent can occur through a signed record or it
can be impliedly met by satisfying one of the following: (1) the sperm
donor showed an intent "to function as a parent of the child no later than
two years after the child's birth" but was unable to do so due to "death,
incapacity, or other circumstances";'25 (2) the sperm donor "[i]ntended to
be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child, if that intent is
established by clear and convincing evidence";126 or (3) "[i]f the birth
mother is a surviving spouse and at her deceased spouse's death no di-
vorce proceeding was pending."'127 The presumption of consent essential-
ly does away with the need for consent to be in writing, unlike the
UPA. 1
28
B. The Uniform Parentage Act
Section 707 of the UPA, titled "Parental Status of Deceased Indi-
vidual," addresses the issue of posthumously conceived children. 129 The
statute states:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent
of the child. 1
30
120. § 15-11-120(4); § 45-2-120(D); Bryant, supra note 12, at 931.
121. § 15-11-120(6); § 45-2-120(F); see Bryant, supra note 12, at 931.
122. § 15-11-120(l 1); § 45-2-120(K).
123. § 15-11-120(11); § 45-2-120(K).
124. § 15-11-120(1 I)(a)-(b); § 45-2-120(K)(1)-(2).
125. § 15-11-120(6)(b)(11); § 45-2-120(F)(2)(b).
126. § 15-11-120(6)(b)(111); § 45-2-120(F)(2)(c).
127. § 15-11-120(8)(b); § 45-2-120(H)(2).
128. Matystik, supra note 106, at 291.
129. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
130. Id.
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Similar to the UPC, section 707 was modelled after an amendment o the
USCACA.131 Eight states have adopted the UPA in part or in whole.'
32
Both Wyoming and Utah included aspects of the Act in their intestacy
laws to acknowledge posthumously conceived children.'
33
Several differences between the UPC and the UPA are worth not-
ing. Unlike the UPC, section 707 of the UPA does not provide a time
frame after the death of the father in which the woman must conceive the
child. 34 Additionally, the 2000 version of the UPA required written con-
sent if a "spouse" died before placement of the sperm; not just any indi-
vidual.135 It was amended in 2002 to apply to both spouses and non-
spouses who consent in writing.' 36 Finally, the UPA requires the parent's
consent to be in writing.' 37 The UPC, however, allows for a presumption
of consent of a posthumously conceived child. 38
1. Utah
Utah adopted laws regarding the parental status of a deceased
spouse similar to those defined under the 2000 version of the UPA.
139
The amendment, codified in U.C.A. subsection 78b-15-707 and effective
in 2008, provides, "If a spouse dies before placement of ... sperm...
the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child," unless he
"consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after
death" he "would be the parent of the child."'
' 40
The definition of "parent" is contained in subsection 78b-15-201,
but the definition of "consent" is not defined anywhere in Utah's UPA.
141
Utah's definition of "parent" requires that the father establish a parent-
child relationship.42 The father establishes the parent-child relationship
by "having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7,
Assisted Reproduction [78b-15-707], which resulted in the birth of the
child.' '143 Thus, the definition of a parent is circular within section 78b-
15-707 and the child can only receive inheritance rights if the father es-
tablishes consent to be the parent of the child. 44 The case that illustrates
131. Goffe, supra note 100, at 25.
132. Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspxtitle=Parentage%20Act (last visited May 26, 2014).
133. Goffe, supra note 100, at 18-24.
134. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.




139. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78b-15-707 (LexisNexis 2013); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.
140. § 78b-15-707.
141. Bums v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 555 (Utah 2012).
142. Id.
143. § 78b-15-201(2)(e).
144. Burns, 289 P.3d at 555.
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this Utah law, Burns v. Astrue, is discussed in more detail in Part III of
this Comment.
2. Wyoming
Wyoming adopted section 707 of the UPA of 2000.141 Section 14-2-
907, titled "Parental Status of Deceased Individual," directly addresses
the issue of posthumously conceived children.146 It requires that the fa-
ther consent to be the parent "before placement of ... sperm."'147 Wyo-
ming's definition of a "parent" begins in section 14-2-501, which states
that a "father-child relationship is established" when the man has "con-
sented to assisted reproduction by his wife under article 8 of this act
which resulted in the birth of the child.,148 Thus, like Utah, Wyoming
requires consent before the placement of the sperm for artificial insemi-
nation, but it does not specify a time limit after the death of the father.
C. Other Approaches in the Tenth Circuit
1. Kansas
Kansas's intestacy succession statute defines a child to mean a "bio-
logical child[].,,149 A "posthumous child" is explicitly included in this
definition. 50 However, a posthumously conceived child is not mentioned
in this statute, nor in Kansas case law. In Baugh v. Baugh,151 a child born
just a few months after the father died intestate received the entirety of
the wrongful-death insurance money.52 Both the parents and the girl-
friend of the dead father tried to split the insurance money but were de-
nied because a Kansas statute explicitly leaves the inheritance of a parent
who dies intestate and without a spouse to the surviving children in order
to protect the interests of the child.
53
The intestacy law in Kansas defines child to be the biological child.
A posthumously conceived child whose father is clearly the man from
whom the woman is trying to receive the benefits may be able to receive
benefits based on her deceased husband's wages.154 However, Kansas
courts have not directly addressed the issue; thus, it has yet to be deter-
mined whether a posthumously conceived child will be able to inherit
from the father.
145. Goffe, supra note 100, at 18-24.
146. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2013).
147. Id.
148. § 14-2-501(b)(v).
149. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501(a) (2013).
150. Id.
151. Baugh v. Baugh ex rel. Smith, 973 P.2d 202 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
152. Id. at 204-05.
153. Id. at 206.
154. § 59-501(a).
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2. Oklahoma
Oklahoma adopted the UPA, but did not adopt its intestacy laws for
children.155 Oklahoma law states, "Posthumous children are considered
as living at the death of their parents.'  This statute seems to provide
for benefits for posthumously conceived children without any prerequi-
sites, but the statute does not distinguish between posthumous children
and posthumously conceived children.57 At the time this statute was
enacted, however, cryopreservation was not as popular as it is now.1
58
Therefore, it may be difficult for an advocate to make the case that post-
humously conceived children should be included in this definition.
III. BURNS V. ASTRUE: THE UTAH SUPREME COURT REJECTS SOCIAL
SECURITY BENEFITS FOR POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF CONSENT
A. Facts
Michael Bums was married to his wife, Gayle, for just two-and-a-
half years when he discovered he had cancer.59 Fearing he would be-
come sterile from radiation treatment and chemotherapy, the couple de-
cided to cryogenically preserve his sperm at the University of Utah
School of Medicine, Division of Urology.' 60 Before preserving the se-
men, Mr. Bums filled out a storage agreement with the University.'
61
Importantly, subsection 31 of the agreement gave Mr. Burns two options
as to how the University would deal with his semen upon his death.
62
Option one was to destroy the semen, which Mr. Bums left blank.163 Op-
tion two, which he initialed, stated that the semen was to be
"[m]aintained in storage for future donation to Gayle Burns... who will
assume all of the obligations and terms described in this contract."'
64
Michael Bums filled out his wife's name in the blank showing his intent
to have his wife receive the sperm upon his death.
165
Unfortunately, "cancer-related complications" claimed Mr. Bums's
166life in March 2001. His wife, however, using artificial insemination,
155. Parentage Act, supra note 132 (showing a map where Oklahoma has adopted the Uniform
Parentage Act). Section 707 of the Uniform Parentage Act is different than the Oklahoma provision,
thus Oklahoma has not adopted the UPA to address posthumously conceived children. Compare
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 228 (2013), with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
156. tit. 84, § 228.
157. Courtney Hannon, Comment, Astrue v. Capato: Forcing a Shoe That Doesn't Fit, 16 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 403, 412-13 (2013).
158. Id. at 413.
159. Bums v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 553 (Utah 2012).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 556.






was able to use her husband's cryogenically preserved sperm to conceive
a child two years after his death.67 Shortly after giving birth to a child,
I.M.B., on December 23, 2003, Mrs. Burns applied for social security
benefits for both herself and for her child based on her deceased hus-
band's income.168 The SSA twice denied her application for benefits on
the grounds that she had failed to show that her child was "Mr. Bums's
'child' as defined by the Social Security Act. 1 69
B. Procedural History
After Mrs. Bums's application was rejected twice by the SSA, both
an administrative law judge and the Third Judicial District Court of Utah
ruled that she should have received benefits based on her deceased hus-
band's income.170 The state court decided that Mr. Burns was the father
of the child and the administrative law judge reversed the SSA's decision
to reject her application.'17 The SSA's Appeals Council reopened her
case due to "errors in the administrative law judge's decision granting
benefits" and ruled that Gayle "was not entitled to benefits ... because
they had not shown that I.M.B. was the 'child' of Mr. Burns as defined in
the Social Security Act., 172 Gayle Bums appealed to the United States
District Court in Utah where the court certified the state law question
giving the Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction over the matter.
73
C. Opinion
As a result of the Social Security Act leaving the status of the child
to state intestacy laws, the court was required to interpret a section of the
Utah Uniform Parentage Act.174 It states:
If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the
deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the de-
ceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child. 
175
Due to the clear language of the statute, the court noted that it was im-
portant to find some evidence of Mr. Burns's consent to have his cryo-
genically preserved sperm result in the birth of the child.176 The court
then looked to the meaning of "parent" as defined by the UPA, which
circularly defines parent as dependent upon the formation of a parent-
167. Id.







175. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78b-15-707 (LexisNexis 2013).
176. Burns, 289 P.3d at 554.
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child relationship. 177 In order for a dead parent to establish a parent-child
relationship, the deceased spouse must "consent to 'be a parent of the
child."'
178
Mrs. Burns argued that subsection 31 alone constituted her hus-
band's consent to be the child's parent.179 Additionally, she directed the
court's attention to the agreement's "numerous references to pregnancy
... and artificial insemination," which further "demonstrate[d] that sub-
section 31 constitute[d] Mr. Burns's consent to be a parent of a child con-
ceived after his death."'80 For instance, the first section of the agreement
stated, "[s]emen is desired by the donor for one or more of the following
reasons."'8 The possible choices were: (1) "[p]rior to irradiation and/or
chemotherapy, and" (2) "[p]rior to artificial insemination."82 But Mr.
Burns never circled or indicated in any way that he chose "[p]rior to arti-
ficial insemination."'183 In fact, Mrs. Burns admitted that, if her husband
had chosen, he would have circled "[p]rior to irradiation and/or chemo-
therapy" instead of "[p]rior to artificial insemination.
' 184
Mrs. Burns further urged the court to consider other parts of the
agreement as evidence of consent, but the court rejected her arguments
because "something more is required to constitute consent."'8 5 The court
noted that the purpose is clearly stated in the first sentence of the agree-
ment: "to act as an agreement o store semen for the purpose of ... stor-
age in liquid nitrogen."'8 6 Furthermore, Mr. Burns did not choose to cir-
cle "[p]rior to artificial insemination" in the first section.87 The other
areas that Mrs. Burns argued were evidence of consent dealt with either
fee scheduling for the semen storage or "the process under which the
University [would] release the samples to the donor."' 88 The court con-
cluded that these sections had nothing to do with consent to be the parent
of the child. 8 9 Thus, the court held that the agreement did "not constitute
sufficient consent in a record to be the parent of a child conceived by
artificial means following the donor's death" under Utah Code Annotat-
ed section 78b-15-707.190
177. Id. at 555 (citing § 78b-15-102(17)).
178. Id. (quoting § 78b-15-707).
179. Id. at 556.
180. Id.
181. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id. at 557.
186. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).






The court did not elaborate on its explanation of "something more is
required to constitute consent."'191 By making this statement, however,
the court implied that if the contract explicitly addressed consent in an-
other manner, then the contract would have constituted consent on the
record.
IV. MORAL AND POLICY CONCERNS IN LIGHT OF BURNS V. ASTRUE AND
TENTH CIRCUIT STATE INTESTACY LAWS
A. The Administration of Estates
States have begun to acknowledge the need to protect posthumously
conceived children by permitting them to inherit from a parent who dies
intestate.'92 There are, however, still states that either expressly exclude
posthumously conceived children from their statutes or do not address
their needs at all.193 There are several arguments for and against exclud-
ing posthumously conceived children. Some argue that exclusion brings
finality to the distribution of the estate.94 Others argue that it is socially
disadvantageous for the child to be brought up in a single-parent home.'
95
Those states excluding posthumously conceived children argue that
"waiting for the potential birth" of the child "could tie up estate distribu-
tions indefinitely."'' 96 Excluding posthumously conceived children brings
finality to the distribution of the estate and provides for a more fair and
efficient process when probate courts are administering estates.197 This
argument, however, is misguided.98 Probate matters are already a
lengthy process.199 The personal representative is not required to provide
immediacy in the distribution of assets, but merely to ensure that assets
are distributed properly.200 Oftentimes a personal representative will wait
many months before distributing assets. For instance, in some states,
personal representatives must wait at least four months in order to allow
creditors ample opportunity to bring claims against the decedent's es-
tate.z0z In addition, personal representatives may further delay distribu-
tion in order to ensure that the resolution of disputed claims, payment of
191. Id.
192. Banks, supra note 22, at 259.
193. States that expressly exclude posthumously conceived children are as follows: Arkansas,
Florida, Minnesota, and Ohio; States that do not address posthumously conceived children are as
follows: Maine, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Bryant, supra note 12, at 931.
194. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 406.
195. Banks, supra note 22, at 298.
196. Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184 (N.H. 2007);
Carpenter, supra note 14, at 406 n.379.
197. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 406 (citing In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (Sur. Ct.
2007)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 407.
200. Id. at 406-07.
201. Id. at 407.
202. Id.
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taxes, inability to contact heirs, or other business matters are attended
to.
203
B. The Interests of the Woman and Child
Proponents of exclusion also argue that it would be socially disad-
vantageous for the child to be born after the death of a parent.20 4 Some
scholars note that single-parent mothers are more likely to bring up chil-
dren who will be poor, drop out of school, and take part in delinquent
activity.20 5 Thus, posthumously conceived children degrade the tradition-
al American family and keep children from developing a relationship
with their parents.20 6 Under these arguments, birth of the child should not
be encouraged.
Additionally, excluding posthumously conceived children ignores
women's reproductive rights and causes them to be marginalized and
discriminated against simply because they chose to conceive after the
death of the father.207 Professor Gloria Banks, a scholar on wills and
trusts, concedes that while public policy should not necessarily promote
"orphaned children," there are constitutional safeguards protecting wom-
en's reproductive rights, which should not be restricted in any manner by
the state.20 8 The right to procreate is constitutionally protected and, as
Justice Douglas wrote in Skinner v. Oklahoma,209 is "one of the basic
civil rights of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.210 Punishing posthumously conceived children merely because
the mother opted to reproduce after the death of the father cuts against
the fundamental civil right described by Justice Douglas in Skinner.
21
1
By restricting procreation rights, the state withholds much-needed bene-
fits from single-parent households.2 12 Posthumously conceived children
are often brought up in single-parent households, which causes govem-
mental benefits to be more important than ever.213 The woman and child
are in need of the benefits and society is prejudicing them by not consid-
ering their interests.
214
Several different interests need to be balanced when determining
whether posthumously conceived children should inherit from a deceased
203. Id.
204. Banks, supra note 22, at 298.
205. Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 62 (1995) (citing
Sara McLanahan & Karen Booth, Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, and Politics, 51 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 557 (1989)).
206. Banks, supra note 22, at 299.
207. Id. at 302.
208. Id. at 298-99.
209. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
210. Id. at 541; Banks, supra note 22, at 302.
211. Banks, supra note 22, at 302 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
212. Matystik, supra note 106, at 281.
213. Id.
214. Banks, supra note 22, at 302.
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parent, including the interests of the child, the deceased parent, the sur-
viving parent, and the state.215 As most states in the Tenth Circuit have
already done, state statutes should uniformly address time limits and
requirements of consent in order to balance the interests of all the parties
involved.2 16 But encouraging legislatures to draft and adopt a model act
is tricky, as Justice Breyer noted during oral arguments for Capato /.217
He speculated that legislatures would perceive the situation as one where
children conceived by traditional methods were already consuming the
Social Security trust fund,2t 8 and posthumously conceived children
would "take the money away from the other children.,
219
Justice Breyer's point brings up the question of whether a mother
who makes a conscious choice to conceive a child after her husband or
lover has died should be entitled to benefits at taxpayer expense. A good
argument can be made that a woman who has made a deliberate choice to
bear a deceased man's child should be responsible for all of the expens-
es. States that exclude posthumously conceived children are "stigmatiz-
ing and isolating" the children by preventing them from establishing a
parent-child relationship for the purposes of receiving social security
benefits.22 ° Society should not treat these children as "modem day
Frankensteins.22 1 They are human beings whose "liberties and rights are
indisputably protected by principles of fairness and equity promoted by
the Constitution."22 2 Thus, a balance should be struck between the inter-
ests of the surviving partner or spouse, the decedent who donated the
223sperm, the posthumously conceived child, and the state.
V. ALLOWING STATES TO ADDRESS POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILDREN
Currently, federal law does not expressly provide benefits for post-
224humously conceived children. As stated previously, the SSA requires
parties to refer to their state's intestacy laws. 225 Due to the delicate na-
ture of issues involved with posthumously conceived children, many
scholars argue for a federal amendment o the Act in order to bring about
215. Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society's Response to the Needs of Posthumously Con-
ceived Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 1067, 1090 (2003).
216. Morgan Kirkland Wood, Note, It Takes a Village: Considering the Other Interests at
Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived Children, 44 GA. L. REV. 873,
898, 904-05 (2010).
217. Matystik, supra note 106, at 279-80.
218. Id. at 281-82.
219. Id. at 281.
220. Id.
221. Banks, supra note 22, at 303.
222. Id. at 304.
223. See Wood, supra note 216, at 902.
224. Raymond C. O'Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 332, 358 (2009).
225. Id.
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national uniformity.226 However, in light of the recent government grid-
lock and shutdown, the SSA's ability to look at posthumously conceived
children on a "case-by-case" basis227 is not likely nor is it feasible.
Furthermore, a federal amendment expressly providing benefits for
posthumously conceived children would run contrary to the Act's pur-
pose and Congress's original intent in promulgating the Act.228 Posthu-
mously conceived children were not contemplated during the drafting of
the Act because the technology to produce them was not available at that
time.229 The purpose of the Act was originally "to provide... dependent
members of [a wage earner's] family with protection against the hardship
occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured's] earnings."230 The aim was not
to benefit the needy, but to provide support for a child who lost a living
parent so the child was not thrust into poverty.231 Congress was attempt-
ing to protect the Social Security trust fund by limiting the benefits to
those children who were no longer able to receive their parents' sup-
port.232 It is therefore tough to argue that survivor benefits should be ex-
tended for a child of someone who "did not exist" when the child was
born.233 By allowing states to address the issue, more children may actu-
ally be benefitting than otherwise would be the case under a uniform
federal approach.234
At least one author has argued that the SSA is more capable than the
states to handle the distribution of federal funds on a "case-by-case ba-
sis",235 because the organization has added many people to its staff and
has "plenty of resources.,236 The federal government, however, initiated
federal spending cuts in 2013,237 causing federal agencies to impose
mandatory sequestration on current employees and initiate nationwide
hiring freezes.238 For example, many agencies had to shut down opera-
tions in late 2013,239 including the SSA.240 During the Congressional
226. Banks, supra note 22, at 258; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 822.
227. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012).
228. Bryant, supra note 12, at 923.
229. Matystik, supra note 106, at 280.
230. Capato I1, 132 S. Ct. at 2032 (alterations in original) (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S.
47, 52 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Bryant, supra note 12, at 943.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 943-44.
234. Matystik, supra note 106, at 280-81.
235. The Supreme Court stated in Capato I! that the SSA was not capable of handling the issue
of posthumously conceived children because they would have to do so on a "case-by-case basis"
since each case is unique and requires analysis. Capato 11, 132 S. Ct. at 2032-33.
236. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 845.
237. Joe Davidson, Report: Sequestration Cuts Could Get Worse in 2014, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,
2013, at B04.
238. First Command. Federal Employees Bracing for Second Round of Sequestration,
WIRELESS NEWS, Nov. 6, 2013.
239. Congress Lays Groundwork for Blame over Obamacare and Possible Shutdown, WASH.




gridlock of 2013, up to 800,000 federal employees were furloughed, and
241only the most "essential" workers were kept in federal offices. Austeri-
ty measures will most likely continue for some time, because of Con-
gress's continuous gridlock over making federal deficit decisions.242
Thus, the SSA may not be in a position to cope with a uniform change in
federal law that would require the agency to look at each and every post-
humously conceived child case.243 Allowing states to address the issue of
federal benefits is not only more efficient, but it complies with the con-
cept of federalism that prompted Congress to defer to state intestacy
laws.24
Because of the SSA's inability to take on cases of posthumously
conceived children, the UPC and the UPA are currently the best vehicles
for providing benefits to applicants. The two model codes restrict the
pool of qualifying individuals by requiring either recorded consent or
imposing time limits.2 45 This mode of qualifying individuals is the best
method of balancing the interests of the deceased father, the woman con-
ceiving, the taxpayers, and the posthumous child.246 Like Burns v.
Astrue, the UPA's requirement of recorded consent must indicate that the
sperm is to be used specifically for artificial insemination in the case of
death of the father.247 This requirement prevents applicants from filing
fraudulent claims that may have been against the wishes of the dece-
dent.248
Although the UPA and UPC are the best options, the UPA's strict
consent requirement does not adequately address the interests of the
posthumously conceived child.249 Additionally, the UPC allows an appli-
cant to receive benefits even if there is no express written consent, which
may result in the interests of the deceased not accurately being fol-
250lowed. Some argue, however, that a lack of written consent should not
keep a child from inheritance rights because a non-posthumous child can
already inherit without specific consent when the parent dies intestate.25'
240. Annie Kami, Government Shutdown Leaves Local Furloughed Workers Struggling with
Bills, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2013, 2:58 AM,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/shutdown-leaves-furoughed-workers-struggling-article-
1.1477581.
241. Lockheed Martin to Furlough 3K Workers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 4, 2013.
242. Davidson, supra note 237.
243. The Supreme Court stated that it would be "burdensome" for the SSA to make "case-by-
case determinations" as to whether a child was "dependent on her father's earnings." Capato II, 132
S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012). Thus, it can be inferred that this burden coupled with the current austerity
measures being taken by the federal government weighs against requiring the SSA to rule upon each
posthumously conceived child case.
244. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 844-45.
245. Matystik, supra note 106, at 287, 289.
246. Id. at 282.
247. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
248. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 421.
249. Matystik, supra note 106, at 287.
250. See id. at 289-91.
251. Id. at 283.
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Ultimately, requiring written consent should be required to prove the
intent of the decedent and to protect against "fraudulent claims by sur-
viving partners.252
In regard to time limits, the only states within the Tenth Circuit that
impose such constraints are Colorado and New Mexico. Benjamin Car-
penter argues that ime constraints allow the states "to provide finality to
the administration process in those scenarios where a posthumously con-
ceived child could 'divest' others of all or a part of their share of the de-
cedent's estate.,253 Otherwise, an estate would have to wait-potentially
for years-for a posthumous child to be born, thus requiring an estate to
remain open indefinitely.254 The time constraint imposed by Colorado
and New Mexico is three years for conception, which allows the wife a
period of grieving for her lost loved one, a certain amount of time to
make an informed decision, several attempts at becoming pregnant, and
"a fairly efficient estate administration.,255
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because many Americans move from state to state for various rea-
sons, state statutes addressing posthumously conceived children should
256be more uniform. However, the legislative process of adopting a large
package such as the UPC or UPA is difficult and cumbersome.2 Addi-
tionally, the potentially hot-button interests involved with posthumous
conception and the impact on the federal budget of providing for these
children are the sorts of issues likely to produce more demagoguery than
compromise between liberal and conservative politicians.25 8 As previous-
ly discussed, the interests involved with posthumous conception include:
(1) the SSA's trust fund and its potential depletion; (2) a state's desire to
promote efficiency and speed in its probate courts; (3) the desires of the
deceased father and the need for his consent; (4) the woman's reproduc-
tive rights; (5) the inheritance rights of children born during the hus-
band's lifetime; (6) and the rights of the posthumously conceived chil-
dren themselves.259
A hybrid UPA-UPC standard would best strike a balance between
all interests involved.2 60 This model would include the "written consent
252. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 421.
253. Id. at 425.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 424-26; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120(K) (West 2013).
256. Probate Code Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%2OCode (last visited May 26, 2014).
257. Id.
258. Historically, the issues of the woman's reproductive rights and issues relating to the
federal budget have proven to be extremely divisive. See Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice:
Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 413 (2013); Federal Govern-
ment Shuts Down, FRONTRUNNER, Oct. 1, 2013.
259. See Matystik, supra note 106, at 282.
260. Id. at 292.
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requirement of the UPA" and the "time limit requirement of the UPC.' ' 2 6I
Use of the time limit requirement from the UPC would allow states to
bring the desired finality to the distribution of the estates, while also al-
lowing women to have a period of grieving for their loved one. Although
the three-year time limit proposed by the UPC seems arbitrary, the
NCCUL Commissioners chose that period to allow the "surviving spouse
or partner a period of grieving, time to make up his or her mind about
whether to go forward with assisted reproduction, and a reasonable al-
lowance for unsuccessful ... pregnancy."262 The thirty-six month period
also "coincides with Section 3-1006, under which an heir is allowed to
recover property improperly distributed or its value from any distributee
during the later of three years after the decedent's death or one year after
distribution.'" 263 Thus, the UPC's time restriction serves both the interests
of the state and the interests of the woman involved in the posthumous
conception.
The consent requirement is important for the decedent's interests
because it ensures that only an intended beneficiary receives the inher-
itance rights.264 The UPA's consent requirement has been criticized as
being too strict (requiring consent on the record), which can result in
inheritance rights "be[ing] overly exclusive."265 However, the UPC's
consent requirement allows for too many presumptions, which could
possibly lead to more fraudulent claims and could prevent the decedent's
266intent from being considered. Thus, the combination of the time re-
strictions from the UPC and the consent requirement from the UPA
would be most amenable to providing for all the interests involved.
One final solution would require sperm donor sites to provide a
consent form that would establish a parent-child relationship in the event
the wife decides to conceive a child by inseminating herself with her
husband's sperm after his death.267 The drafters of the UPC refer to Cali-
fornia Health and Safety Code section 1644.7 as a model consent form
for sperm donor sites to use.268 Requiring such a form would force the
couple to specifically consider the issue and make their intentions clear
from the beginning. Use of such a form would also "promote efficien-
261. Id.
262. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. subsec. (k) (2010); Carpenter, supra note 14, at
373-74.
263. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. subsec. (k).
264. Matystik, supra note 106, at 283.
265. Id. (stating that the consent-on-the-record requirements are too strict, because "state[s]
will generally allow a non-posthumously conceived biological child to inherit when there is not a
will").
266. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 420 (stating that if legislatures did not "require proof that the
decedent consented to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material .. the door would be open
to the possibility of improper posthumous use of one's genetic material-for instance, postmortem
sperm retrieval").
267. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 legis. note.; Homer, supra note 13, at 176.
268. Matystik, supra note 106, at 289.
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cy ' ' 269 by removing any difficulty the woman might later have when
faced with trying to prove the wishes of the father regarding the child
born in these peculiar circumstances.
Lane Thomasson*
269. Id.
* J.D. candidate 2015, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
the Denver University Law Review staff and board as well as Professor Roberto Corrada for their
time and effort spent editing this Comment. Thank you to my aunt and uncle, Merrill Shields and
Ray Thomasson, for their constant love and support. Above all, I would also like to thank my hus-
band, Morley Swingle, for being my cheerleader and tolerating my life as a law student.
[Vol. 91:3
